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The Case of Carbon Taxation
Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. Vollebergh
3.1 Introduction
Implementing environmental policies—through standards, tradable
permits, or environmental taxes alike—is far from costless. For instance,
when implementing an environmental tax, the tax department has to run
a special unit to enforce and collect taxes and to monitor compliance. In
practice, the costs of implementing environmental policies play a signiﬁ-
cant role in the choice between policy options. The proposals of the Euro-
pean Commission for a European-wide energy/CO2 tax provide clear ex-
amples (Vollebergh 1995). Instead of proposing a totally new tax on CO2
emissions, the European Commission employed the close linkage between
CO2 emissions and the implicit taxation of carbon by the existing taxes
on energy products (which are usually intermediate inputs). Indeed, using
existing instruments rather than introducing new ones to address new pol-
icy areas may save considerably on administrative costs.
However, just the minimization of transaction costs might come at a
cost for society. A strategy based on input taxes, for example, forgoes the
gains that are potentially reaped by a more direct way of taxing the exter-
nality through emissions taxes. Any deviation from the principle of taxing
externalities at the point where they arise introduces an incentive to misal-
locate resources. Thus a trade-oﬀ arises between minimizing transaction
costs and directly inducing incentive eﬀects. The optimal tax structure has
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91to balance the burden of complex and expensive-to-run tax systems
against the incentives it induces to internalize the externality that it aims
to address.
This paper investigates the potential trade-oﬀ between administrative
costs and incentives of environmental regulation, in particular if the gov-
ernment aims to reduce CO2 emissions. We analyze how the optimal
choice of carbon taxes is aﬀected by the administrative costs incurred by
the regulator (government). Using a simple model, we determine the opti-
mal rates for emissions and input taxes in the presence of administrative
costs and which of these taxes should optimally be introduced. Moreover,
we explore and interpret the scarce empirical evidence on administrative
costs of taxation in the light of optimal carbon taxation. Because empirical
information on the role of implementation costs in the design of environ-
mental policy is almost entirely lacking, we concentrate on what factors
might be expected to determine those costs, based on studies of adminis-
trative costs outside the environmental policy area.
Although most formal analysis of environmental regulation ignores ad-
ministrative costs, compliance costs, or transaction costs in general, a
growing literature takes these issues seriously (see the overview in Krutilla
1999).1 Several papers recognize that administrative costs may be impor-
tant and rule out the use of emissions taxes on these grounds. Typically
investigated is which taxes could best replace or “approximate” emissions
taxes (Smith 1992). Moreover, under some circumstances other taxes or
tax combinations are equivalent to perfect emissions taxes (i.e., emissions
taxes in a world without transaction costs). For instance, Xepapadeas
(1999) reviews the conditions under which input taxes and emissions taxes
are equivalent. Eskeland and Devarajan (1996) show how the combination
of mandated technology and output taxes approaches the ideal emissions
tax. Fullerton and Wolverton (1997) propose to combine output taxes and
subsidies on clean goods, or more general two-part instrument systems of
a deposit-refund nature, to replace the emissions tax that involves costly
monitoring.
The implicit assumption in these papers, however, is that emissions taxes
are prohibitively costly to administer and that other taxes have negligibly
low administrative costs. We extend this approach by more explicitly tak-
ing into account the administrative costs of all types of taxes, without
assuming beforehand that emissions taxes are always the most costly type
of tax from the administrative point of view. In particular we allow diﬀer-
ent tax instruments to feature diﬀerences in administrative costs, which,
in addition, are endogenously dependent on the tax rates (cf. Yitzhaki
1979). Once other taxes, as well as emissions taxes, are subject to signiﬁ-
92 Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. Vollebergh
1. The relation between taxation in general and transaction costs is more widely analyzed;
see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998) for an overview.cant administrative costs, it becomes unlikely that the ﬁrst-best optimum
can be reached. Hence, alternative tax systems should be considered that
are no longer equivalent to perfect emissions taxes.
Shortle, Horran, and Abler (1998) research to what extent input taxes
can approach perfect emissions taxes if not all inputs that directly aﬀect
emissions can be taxed. We extend their analysis by explicitly taking into
account administrative costs and allowing for the simultaneous use of
emissions and input taxes. We ﬁnd that a mixed tax system might be
(second-best) optimal. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) arrive at a similar
result using a model of mixed output and emissions taxation that incorpo-
rates monitoring. We complement their analysis by investigating input tax-
ation and by exploring in more detail how optimal tax rates in the presence
of administrative costs diﬀer from Pigouvian taxes. Administrative costs
in our model mainly represent costs stemming from monitoring, and thus
our paper is related to the literature on monitoring and enforcement of
environmental policy (see Cohen 1998 for a survey). Because we are pri-
marily interested in optimal taxation rather than optimal monitoring, we
do not model monitoring in an explicit way.
The theoretical part of this chapter is also closely related to Fullerton,
Hong, and Metcalf (chap. 1 in this volume). The two chapters complement
one another in various respects. Both chapters compare ideal emissions
taxes with alternative taxation, but they diﬀer with respect to the produc-
tion structure and the government budget constraint. First, Fullerton,
Hong, and Metcalf analyze a model in which there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between input use and emissions. Input taxes and emissions
taxes are therefore equivalent, but output taxes provide an (imperfect) sub-
stitute form of taxation. In contrast, our model separates input use from
emissions, and considers abatement explicitly. Accordingly, we allow for
three ways to reduce pollution: output reduction, input reduction, and
abatement. We study input taxation as an (imperfect) substitute for emis-
sions taxes. Second, whereas Fullerton, Hong, and Metcalf consider a sec-
ond-best world with a distortionary labor tax for revenue-raising purposes,
the second-best nature of the policies considered here arises because of ad-
ministrative costs. Thus, the present chapter abstracts from tax-inter-
action eﬀects due to recycling eﬀects.
The structure of our paper is as follows. First, we explain the nature of
the trade-oﬀ involved if the implementation costs of corrective taxes, in
particular administrative costs, are considered explicitly. Second, we ana-
lyze a stylized model that incorporates both emissions and input taxes to
sort out critical determinants that shape this trade-oﬀ. Finally, we evaluate
both explicit and implicit carbon taxation in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in terms of the trade-oﬀ
and suggest some opportunities for welfare-improving carbon tax policies.
Note in advance that taxing carbon inputs is not equivalent to taxing CO2
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tween the carbon content of energy products and CO2 emissions, this is
not a ﬁxed chemicotechnological relationship because several opportuni-
ties for carbon abatement or removal exist (Okken et al. 1992).
3.2 The Trade-oﬀ between Incentives and Administrative Costs
In this section we argue that the administrative costs argument per se is
not suﬃcient to rule out the implementation of emissions taxes. In the
presence of administrative costs, the costs and beneﬁts associated with
each speciﬁc type of tax should be compared. First, we hypothesize which
factors inﬂuence the shape of the administrative-costs curve. Next, we
show why administrative costs introduce such a general trade-oﬀ between
the costs and beneﬁts of various implementation strategies. We also de-
velop some useful terminology.
3.2.1 Administrative Costs
We deﬁne transaction costs as the costs associated with tax assessment,
collection, and enforcement; and all other costs incurred by any party to
enable, facilitate, and ensure transactions from taxpayers to tax authorities
(Vollebergh 1995). An alternative term that we use is implementation costs.
The terms include ex ante costs (e.g., costs of exclusion) and ex post costs
(e.g., monitoring costs). It is common to categorize these costs further into
costs for the government (tax receiver), or administrative costs, to handle
forms and enforce compliance, and the costs for the tax-liable agent (tax-
payer), or compliance costs, to carry out the obligations of calculating and
paying the tax (see Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick 1989). In our anal-
ysis we concentrate on administrative costs.2
Administrative costs of a particular tax are closely related to the base
to which the tax is applied. The tax base usually varies with the type of tax.
For example, an emissions tax taxes the physical volumes of hazardous
substances, while an input tax taxes such substances indirectly, for in-
stance through their use as (intermediate) inputs. In turn, these diﬀerences
induce both tax authorities and taxpayers to set up and maintain various
systems for collecting and processing information about the tax, that is, to
record how much is emitted or how much input is used, in order to be able
to calculate the total tax payments due.
One important characteristic of the tax base that determines (diﬀerences
in) administrative costs is the number of agents liable for the tax. A large
number of taxable legal units implies a large implementation cost for the
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2. Section 3.4.2, however, shows that administrative and compliance costs turn out to move
together in practice; that is, taxes for which compliance costs are relatively important are
also associated with relatively high administrative costs.tax agency, since each unit requires separate treatment. Taxing a particular
pollutant that is emitted by many producers may be associated with large
administrative costs. Taxing the inputs from which the pollutant arises as
a by-product may be associated with signiﬁcantly lower administrative
costs. For instance, inputs need no longer be taxed at the points of con-
sumption, but can also be taxed at the point of delivery, such as gas sta-
tions or distributors of electricity. Hence, switching from emissions to in-
puts as the tax base could change administrative costs.
Note that the diﬀerence in administrative costs is independent of the
induced regulatory eﬀect. It is a diﬀerence in the ﬁxed-cost component of
administrative costs, that is, the setup cost and part of the cost to run the
information system. Each liable unit submits its own tax form. The cost
of processing forms depends on the number of forms rather than the tax
amount due. Nevertheless, this still leaves the possibility of economies
of scale for a given type of tax. If the tax base can be broadened across
a larger number of taxpayers, the overall administrative costs per taxpayer
can be reduced.
A second important determinant of administrative costs is measurability
of the base. In most cases emissions levels are likely to be more diﬃcult
to measure, report, and record than input or output levels. Heterogeneity
across industries and their technologies compounds the complexity of a
tax system. For instance, a tax base in terms of weighted units of measure-
ment, rather than in terms of a single unit, may be expected to create
higher administrative costs if ﬁrms use highly ﬁrm-speciﬁc technologies.
One well-known example is NOX emissions from road transportation,
which depend on vehicle type, equipment, fuel type, driving patterns, and
so forth (see also Hoel 1998, 89).
Administrative costs are also likely to vary with the tax rates and the
revenue raised. The possibility of evasion by taxpayers requires monitoring
expenditures by regulators. The remark by Fullerton (1996, 7) that many
of the administrative costs “are ‘ﬁxed’ costs of calculating the tax base,
not marginal costs of collecting more revenue by raising the rate of tax on
a given tax base” seems to call for a qualiﬁcation in this respect. The larger
the tax bill, the larger are the incentives to evade tax payment and the more
attractive it is for the regulator to spend resources to reduce tax evasion.
Regulators usually have various strategies for monitoring and need to
sort out the eﬃcient choice of monitoring levels and techniques. A large
literature on monitoring and enforcement studies this policy in detail (Co-
hen 1998). Here, we do not need this level of detail. With respect to envi-
ronmental monitoring, we can safely assume that when the optimal mix of
monitoring instruments is chosen, total cost of monitoring increases with
the number of polluters, the variety of production and abatement tech-
niques used, the importance of stochastic inﬂuences on actual pollution,
and the diﬃculty of measuring emissions.
To sum up, no general shape can be assumed ex ante for diﬀerent types
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costs (varying with the tax rate) play a signiﬁcant role. Both in theory
and practice, we need a case-by-case approach to study the nature and
implications of administrative costs.
3.2.2 The Role of Linkage
The eﬃciency of instruments to reach a certain policy goal is usually
deﬁned in terms of the extent to which the instrument increases social
welfare. The most eﬃcient instrument to hit a given target has the smallest
gross welfare cost, where gross welfare cost3 refers to the change in welfare
apart from that arising from the reduction in the externality.4
In a ﬁrst-best world without transaction costs, diﬀerent instruments can
be ranked in terms of eﬃciency by investigating their eﬀe c to np r i v a t e
welfare. Things become more complicated in a world with transaction
costs because both administrative costs and the linkage between regula-
tory aim, emissions reduction, and the type of regulatory tax used play a
role (Smith 1992).5 First of all, diﬀerent types of taxes usually diﬀer with
respect to the directness of the incentive they provide to reduce emissions
(assuming emissions reduction reﬂects the goal of the government). Less-
direct taxation of the marginal damages caused by an individual polluter
causes an eﬃciency loss, but may lower administrative costs. Furthermore,
diﬀerent instruments distort private welfare not only directly, but also indi-
rectly through their implications for transaction costs. The usual gross wel-
fare cost of taxation has to be supplemented by the transaction costs of
the tax.
Before turning to how welfare analysis of environmental taxation is in-
ﬂuenced by transaction costs, it is useful to clarify our terminology and
make it precise. We explicitly separate the transaction costs from the total
change in welfare associated with the use of a certain (tax) instrument.
Hence, in our case of environmental taxation, we distinguish (1) adminis-
trative (transaction) costs, (2) the welfare gain from an improvement in the
environment, (3) the residual welfare change, that is the gross welfare cost
ignoring transaction costs. The third component is called here private gross
welfare cost. An instrument that has relatively low private gross welfare
3. The term “gross welfare cost” is from Goulder (1995).
4. This deﬁnition applies to corrective taxes. The gross welfare cost in the case of revenue
raising can be similarly deﬁned as the change in welfare apart from that arising from relaxing
the government budget constraint.
5. There is an interesting analogue between the current paper and the long-standing issue
in environmental economics of selecting instruments to improve ambient quality directly or
indirectly through the reduction of emissions. It is well known that the linkage between
emissions and ambient quality is often indirect, but the cost of ambient-quality regulation
can be prohibitive. Thus an interesting trade-oﬀ exists between the utility loss in terms of
the directness of linkage, on the one hand, and the cost of regulation, on the other hand. We
owe this point to Dallas Burtraw.
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transaction costs, eﬃciency just coincides with this notion of private eﬃ-
ciency, since gross welfare costs do not contain transaction costs.6 Thus,
the relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent types of taxes can be measured with the
following formula:
(1) UYTD E =−− () ,
where U is social welfare of the representative agent, Y is gross private
welfare, T is the welfare loss due to transaction (administrative) costs, and
D is the damage from pollution. Let t1 and t2 be two distinct tax regimes
that yield the same aggregate emissions: E(t1)  E(t2). The private costs of
t1 are lower than those of t2 if Y(t1)  Y(t2).
We do not need to discuss extensively the determinants of private eﬃ-
ciency here, since they are well known from analyses without transaction
costs. For example, the eﬃciency of a tax to internalize pollution externali-
ties is larger if the individual’s tax bill is more directly linked to the exter-
nality. Hence, emissions taxes are more (privately) eﬃcient than input
taxes. Also, eﬃciency requires that the eﬀective tax rate on marginal con-
tributions to damage (D) is equal across polluters. Hence, an emissions
tax that applies to all polluters is (privately) more eﬃcient than an emis-
sions tax with exemptions or a nonuniform emissions tax.
As noted in section 3.1, it is often argued that emissions taxes are too
costly to implement and that administrative costs provide a basic motiva-
tion for other (tax) solutions.7 However, instead of simply assuming that
such a shift away from emissions taxes is optimal, we aim at explicitly
deriving such a conclusion within a comprehensive welfare framework. A
ﬁrst step in this direction has been taken by McKay, Pearson, and Smith
(1990), who hypothesize that a clear trade-oﬀ exists between shifts in the
tax system to save on transaction costs, on the one hand, and tax reforms
that harness incentives and promote (private) eﬃciency, on the other hand.
They assume that regulation that is linked less directly to the externality
does indeed save on administrative costs, but that it comes at a cost to
society by distorting private decisions more.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this. The horizontal axis measures various tax sys-
tems with respect to the directness with which they address incentives to
reduce damage; for example, an emissions tax ranks high and an input tax
6. We realize that this term might be misleading, since transaction costs also aﬀect (ulti-
mately) private welfare. However, the term captures the fact that we focus on administrative
costs that ﬁrst aﬀect the tax authority (and not private agents directly). Indeed, of the three
terms in equation (1), only the ﬁrst (Y) captures direct changes in private welfare. The third
term, the environmental gain, is a “public” component of the welfare change if the environ-
ment is assumed to be a public good. Alternatively, we could have used the terms “frictionless
gross welfare cost” and “frictionless eﬃciency.”
7. In fact, Smith (1992) shows that the basic idea can be traced back to the seminal paper
of Diamond (1973).
Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 97ranks low. Taxes on diﬀerent inputs rank diﬀerently, depending on the
closeness of the linkage between input use and emissions subject to regula-
tion. The vertical axis measures two components of utility. The ﬁgure com-
pares a continuum of tax systems. It is assumed that all of them yield the
same level of damage D by appropriate choice of tax rates. The two curves
represent the other two components of overall utility, transaction costs T
and private utility Y, for each of the tax systems. Administrative costs T
increase when taxation is better linked to emissions. The idea behind this
is that more-direct taxation implies fewer links to already existing pro-
cedures of the existing tax system. Gross private welfare Y also increases
with the linkage of taxation to emissions. The more direct the taxation,
the larger the (private) utility is for a given level of emissions. The optimal
tax system balances transaction costs and eﬃciency. In the ﬁgure, welfare
is maximized by an indirect tax that corresponds to points A and B. The
complete switch to emissions taxes is too costly: The associated increase
in administrative costs would outweigh the gains from having a more-
direct tax with better incentives.
Figure 3.1 is hypothetical and suggestive. As noted before, we have to
assess tax proposals case by case. For example, if marginal administrative
costs increase only slowly, emissions taxes may be optimal despite the pres-
ence of administrative costs. Moreover, it is not at all guaranteed that the
curves T and Y have nice convex and concave shapes, respectively. Smuld-
ers and Vollebergh (1998), for instance, represent the linkage to pollution
by the fraction of (symmetrical) sectors that is liable to an emissions tax
and ﬁnd that in a very simple setting the Y curve ﬁrst declines and then
increases. In general, administrative costs introduce nonconvexities be-
cause of their ﬁxed-cost nature, and the conventional marginal approach
to optimal taxation has to be extended.
Administrative costs have many dimensions. The government may aﬀect
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Fig. 3.1 The basic trade-oﬀ between transaction costs and the eﬃciency of
internalization of tax systemsadministrative costs by varying the number of ﬁrms or sectors subject to
the tax, the tax rates chosen for input and emissions taxes, the accuracy
of measurability aimed for, the enforcement spending to reduce the (prob-
ability of) tax evasion, and so on. Each of these dimensions can be mea-
sured along the horizontal axis in a ﬁgure similar to ﬁgure 3.1. Needless
to say, each of these factors directly inﬂuences the overall welfare eﬀect of
implementing environmental taxes.
It is not only the multidimensionality of administrative costs that makes
the simple diagram in ﬁgure 3.1 problematic. As Feldstein (1976) pointed
out long ago, a distinction should be made between the design of a tax
system de novo and the reform of an existing tax system. This is true for
its associated administrative system as well. Indeed, in practice every tax
reform starts from a given tax and administrative system inherited from
the past. This system determines the (short-run) scope of welfare-im-
proving tax reform at low administrative cost (Smith 1992; Vollebergh
1995).
For instance, increasing existing taxes rather than introducing new taxes
might save on the ﬁxed costs of administration and therefore on total ad-
ministrative costs. It is also attractive to exploit such economies of scale
and scope when designing environmental taxes. Levying environmentally
motivated taxes on a base that is already taxed for other purposes, rather
than introducing an entirely new emissions tax, would certainly save on
administrative costs. Furthermore, economies of scope with the adminis-
trative system used for other regulatory instruments may also arise. When
implementing environmental taxes, the regulator could beneﬁt from expe-
rience in related administrative procedures for operations already under-
taken. As does Smith (1992), we label this use of existing administrative
procedures and experience for new purposes “piggybacking.”
3.3 Critical Determinants Shaping the Trade-Oﬀ
This section develops a simple model along the lines of Kaplow (1990)
and Shortle, Horan, and Abler (1998) to compare emissions taxes and
input taxes in the presence of administrative costs. The aim of the regula-
tor is to correct externalities from pollution. The presence of administra-
tive costs implies that the regulator should deviate from the ﬁrst-best Pi-
gouvian tax. Hence, administrative costs in themselves cause policies to
be second best. We abstract from other second-best issues. In particular,
we assume that lump-sum taxes and transfers are available to the govern-
ment, so that there is no revenue requirement that aﬀects tax rates and we
can ignore labor taxes.8
8. We also abstract from output taxes and abatement subsidies. See Smulders and Volle-
bergh (1999) for the interaction between these instruments and administrative costs.
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We assume a given number of heterogenous sectors, indexed i. The pro-
duction of one unit of ﬁnal output qi requires labor li and a single homoge-
nous intermediate input x (in amount xi). Moreover, ﬁrms can spend labor
services on abatement ai, which reduces emissions per unit of output ei.
The minimum labor requirement per unit of output equals li(xi). Labor
and inputs are substitutes: l i  li/xi 
 0. Emissions per unit of output
depend negatively on abatement eﬀort and positively on inputs: ei(ai,xi)
with e ai  ei/ai 
 0a n de xi  ei/xi 
 0.9
Final-good producers face a (sector-speciﬁc) emissions tax i and a (per-
unit) input tax (txi). Perfect competition prevails, and ﬁrms take the output
price pi as given. They maximize proﬁts by choosing output, abatement,
and input levels. We normalize the wage to unity. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions can be written as
(2) plae pt x i i i i i x xi i =+ + + +  () ,
(3) with equality if  10 ≥− ′ > () , ea ai i i 
(4) with equality if  pt e l x xx i i x i i i ++′ ≥−′ >  0.
Equation (2) says that price equals cost, which in turn equals labor cost
for production, labor cost for abatement, and taxes due per unit of output.
Condition (3) states that with positive abatement levels, the marginal cost
of abatement (on the left-hand side) equals the marginal beneﬁts in the
form of a reduction of emissions tax payments (on the right-hand side).
Condition (4) equates the marginal cost to the marginal beneﬁts of input
use. Marginal input costs consist of the price of the input px, the sector-
speciﬁc input tax txi, and the induced additional emissions tax payments.
Marginal beneﬁts consist of the labor saving in production.
The intermediate good is produced with labor only and subject to con-
stant returns to scale. We choose units such that one unit of labor produces
one unit of the intermediate good. For simplicity we assume that the pro-
duction of the intermediate input is nonpolluting (but this can be easily
modiﬁed in a way that is completely analogous to pollution in the ﬁnal-
goods sector). Intermediate-good producers face a price px, which they
take as given. Hence, their ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization
simply states that the price equals the wage, which is normalized to 1:
(5) px = 1.
9. Furthermore, e xx  0, e aa  0, and l0. We ensure concavity by assuming [l(e a)
e xx]e aa  (e a)(e ax)2  0.
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Xx q ii = ∑ ,
where X is total supply of the intermediate good.
We impose a very simple demand structure by choosing a quasi-linear
utility function with no cross-demand eﬀects, and where the opportunity
cost of labor is constant (and normalized to 1). The utility function is
(6) uu q l D E
i
ii =+ − ∑ () () , 0
where l0 is leisure, D is damage from emissions, and E is aggregate emis-
sions deﬁned as
(7) Ee q ii = ∑ .
Consumers take prices and emissions as given and maximize utility, sub-
ject to their budget constraint piqi  L  l0  Z, where Z are transfers
from the government. The ﬁrst-order conditions read
(8) ′ = up ii .
The government collects tax revenue, pays civil servants for the tax admin-
istration (T), and rebates the remainder of tax revenue to households in a
lump-sum fashion (Z). The tax administration employs T units of labor at
wage w  1. The required administrative costs are sector speciﬁc and de-
pend on sectoral taxes and output levels.11
(9) TF I I V t q i i txi i i xi i =+ ∑ ∑ (,) ( ,, ) ,  
where F represents the ﬁxed costs of the tax system, and V represents the
administrative costs varying with the size of the rates and bases of the tax
system. Fixed costs are determined only by certain taxes being imple-
mented or not. This is modeled by the dependence of F on indicator func-
tions It ˆ, each of which takes the value 1 if tax t ˆ (e.g., i) is positive and the
value 0 if the tax is 0. The natural restrictions we impose are sign V t 
sign t ˆ for any tax t ˆ, that is, both taxes and subsidies are costly to imple-
ment; and Vi(0, 0, qi)  0, that is, all ﬁxed costs are excluded from V(
).
The labor market clears. Labor endowment is ﬁxed and given by L.
Hence, we write
(10) Ll la x qT iii i =+ ++ + ∑ 0 () .
10. To simplify notation, all summation signs refer to summation over all ﬁnal goods sec-
tors, unless stated otherwise.
11. Note that by assuming linear sectoral separability we ignore economies of scope as
discussed in section 3.2.
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(11) Uu q L l a x q T D e q ii i i ii i i =+ − + + − − () ∑∑ ∑ () ( ) .
Totally diﬀerentiating utility, and substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions for
ﬁrms’ and households’ maximization problems (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8),
we obtain
(12) dU t dX dT D dE xi i i i =− − ′ − ∑∑ () , 
where Ei  eiqi is total emissions in sector i and Xi  xiqi is total input use
in sector i. Equation (12) shows the welfare eﬀects associated with changes
in input demands, transaction costs, and environmental quality. The ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side of (12) stands for the distortionary eﬀect of
excises on the goods market associated with input taxes. The last term
reveals that a reduction in emissions ceteris paribus improves utility as
long as the marginal damage is larger than the emissions tax.
3.3.2 Optimal Taxation
We can rewrite equation (12) to separate the three components of wel-
fare, as in equation (1):
(13) dU dE t dX dT D dE i i xi i =+ − − ′ ∑[] . 
Equation (13) categorizes the welfare eﬀect of any policy in the three com-
ponents mentioned in section 3.2.2. The bracketed term on the right-hand
side is the private gross welfare eﬀect of the policy, denoted by dY , in line
with equation (1); dT is the transaction costs of the policy; and DdE 
dD is the environmental welfare gain. Note that the private gross welfare
cost is a tax-base eﬀect; the change in each tax base times the tax rate
corresponding to that tax base together determine this eﬀect.12
In the presence of administrative costs, a necessary condition for opti-
mality of the tax system is that the expression in (13) be 0. The government
maximizes welfare, taking as given the reactions of households and ﬁrms
to changes in taxes. It faces a two-stage decision problem: (1) deciding
which taxes to use (tax-base decision), and (2) setting the appropriate tax
level (tax-rate decision).
Concerning the tax-rate decision, we ﬁnd conditions for optimal taxa-
tion by rewriting equation (12) in terms of the total derivatives with respect
to each of the taxes and setting these expressions equal to 0.13 For any tax
t ˆ this condition reads
12. See the analysis in Bovenberg and Goulder (1998, sec. 3.1).
13. Note that equations (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) allow us to determine how ai, xi, qi, pi,
and px—and hence also li(xi), ei(ai, xi), Ei, Xi, T,a n dU—depend on the tax rates.
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This equation binds only if the tax is implemented; that is, equation (14)
guides the tax decision, conditional on the tax being implemented.
Concerning the tax-base decision, the regulator should compare utility
levels associated with any combination of taxes implemented at the rate
implied by equation (14). The optimal tax system may include nonzero
taxes, set at the level implied by equation (14), as well as zero taxes, that
is, taxes that are not implemented. For the latter taxes, equation (14) may
be violated, that is, utility may marginally increase in this tax. Yet it is
optimal not to implement these taxes. The reason is that, by construction,
in an optimally designed tax system setting any zero tax at the level im-
plied by (14)—and adjusting all nonzero tax rates such that they satisfy
(14)—decreases welfare (nonmarginally) because of ﬁxed administrative
costs. Similarly, in an optimally designed tax system, switching the rate of
any nonzero tax from the rate implied by (14) to a zero rate—and adjust-
ing all other nonzero taxes such that they satisfy (14)—decreases welfare
(nonmarginally). Since ﬁxed administrative costs play a role, the tax-base
decision is subject to nonconvexities and no simple smooth optimality con-
dition can be written.
Instead of optimizing the overall tax system, a more practical issue is to
ﬁnd a welfare improving tax reform. Such an approach takes into account
the fact that actual changes to the tax system are usually slow and piece-
meal due to the role of the existing tax system (Feldstein 1976) and, as we
like to add, its associated administrative costs. A change in an existing tax
system is worth pursuing if this change entails an increase in welfare even
if the maximum level of welfare is not reached. In particular, we are inter-
ested in the welfare eﬀects of the introduction of a new tax, if some taxes
already exist (as well as their associated tax administration). The obvious
ruleforawelfare-improvingintroductionofanewtaxisthatthenetwelfare
gain from exploiting the newly introduced tax should exceed the ﬁxed costs
of introducing the tax. For any taxt ˆ, this condition can be written as14






















where t ˆo is the level of the tax that corresponds to equation (14) (i.e., the
solution to dU/dt ˆ  0, or the corner solution 0), Ft  dT/dI(t ˆ) is the ﬁxed
cost (administrative setup cost) associated with introducing tax t ˆ, t ˆ* is the
14. This condition can be called the “entry condition,” analogous to industrial organiza-
tion models where ﬁrms enter if the operating proﬁts (cf. welfare), measured at the optimal
price (cf. tax), exceed the entry cost (cf. tax introduction/setup cost).
Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 103(second-best) optimal tax rate,15 and we evaluate all total derivatives, tak-
ing into account changes in other taxes so as to satisfy (14) for all other
taxes.
As a benchmark, consider the (ﬁrst-best) case without transaction costs,
that is, T  dT  0. As is well known, the optimal emissions tax then
equals the marginal damage D in each sector and all other taxes should
be 0.16 This can be immediately seen from equation (12). Indeed, equation
(14) is satisﬁed for these tax rates. Under the usual conditions on utility
and production functions, the tax-base optimality condition is automati-
cally met since ﬁxed costs do not play a role and the maximization problem
is convex. Starting from a situation without any taxes, introducing the
emissions tax improves welfare.17
The ﬁrst-best outcome may be realized in some special cases even if
transaction costs play a role. Obviously, if transaction costs are associated
with other taxes, but not with emissions taxes, the Pigouvian tax should
still be implemented. The other way around, if transaction costs apply to
emissions taxes only and other taxes can be implemented without such
costs, a ﬁrst-best outcome may arise provided that other taxes (or tax com-
binations) are equivalent to emissions taxes with respect to their incentive
eﬀects (private eﬃciency). For example, if the emissions-input ratio is
ﬁxed, an input tax can bring about the ﬁrst-best outcome.18
A second-best situation arises when other taxes also involve transaction
costs or when other instruments are privately less eﬃcient than emissions
taxes. Once transaction costs play a role, it is no longer guaranteed that
emissions taxes should be uniform, nor that output or input taxes should
be excluded. Most of the literature on second-best optimal environmental
taxation concentrates on cases in which other taxes (taxes on outputs or
inputs) can replace emissions taxes without loss of incentives and without
administrative costs (e.g., see the double dividend literature; de Mooij
2000).
If administrative costs are mentioned as a reason not to use emissions
15. To be precise, t ˆ* is the tax that maximizes welfare given the set of taxes employed;
t ˆ*  0 if equation (15) is violated.
16. Solving the social-planner problem for the case without transaction costs, we ﬁnd the
following optimality conditions: (1) u i  li  ai  xi  eiD, (2) 1  e aiD with equality if
ai is positive, (3) 1  l i  e xiD with equality if xi is positive. Comparing these conditions
to equations (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8), we ﬁnd that i  D, txi  0 implements the ﬁrst-best
outcome. As a special case, if e ai  0a n de xi  ei/xi ∀ i, any combination of taxes that satisﬁes
i  (xi/ei)txi  D ∀ i also implements the ﬁrst-best social optimum (input taxes and emis-
sions taxes are equivalent, cf. sec. 3.3.4).
17. For this case dU/d reduces to (D)dEi/d, which is positive for 
D. Hence, the
left-hand side of the inequality in (15) is positive while the right-hand side is 0, and (15)
is satisﬁed.
18. Similarly, two-part instruments may do the job. If only one pollutant causes an exter-
nality and if all other outputs and inputs can be taxed at zero transaction costs, the ﬁrst-best
outcome can be reached (see Fullerton and Wolverton 1997). In the present model, this
would require (sector-speciﬁc) taxes on output and input use and a (sector-speciﬁc) subsidy
on abatement. Note, however, that optimality breaks down when more pollutants play a role.
104 Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. Volleberghtaxes, the most common case in the literature is the one in which emissions
taxes are too costly to implement because of the transaction costs associ-
ated with emissions taxes but not with other taxes (the most discussed case
is nonpoint pollution; see Xepapadeas 1999). Our model allows for more
subtle impacts of administrative costs by considering administrative costs
throughout the entire tax system and taking into account that administra-
tive costs may endogenously vary with tax rates. To investigate these in
more detail, we consider some special cases.
3.3.3 Pure Emissions Taxes
Let us ﬁrst focus on emissions taxes by considering the case in which all
other taxes are ruled out. Note that we cannot simply suppose that only
emissions taxes are used; we have to explain within the model why this is
so. We give this explanation in subsection 3.3.4 and concentrate here on
the optimality conditions for emissions taxes only.
Evaluating equation (14) for an emissions tax in sector i, we ﬁnd that
the following optimality conditions should hold:
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This tax should be implemented if the total welfare gain exceeds the ﬁxed
administrative costs; see equation (15). We approximate the welfare gain
by a second-order Taylor expansion, evaluated at i  o
i. The optimal tax
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where E and T are the positively deﬁned elasticities of dE/d and dT/d
with respect to .
Conditions (17) and (18) reveal two cases in which it is optimal not to
use emissions taxes in a particular sector because of administrative costs.
The ﬁrst case is the case in which the ﬁxed costs of administering the tax
are large relative to the total potential gains; see equation (18). The gains
are small indeed if emissions are insensitive to the emissions tax, that is, if
abatement andchanges in the input mix are expensive (dEi/di small), if the
marginal damage (D) is small, and if marginal administrative costs (dT/
Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 105di) are large.19 A second case in which a sector should be optimally ex-
empted from an emissions tax is the case in which marginal administrative
costs for the sector are relatively large, such that, for any small increase in
the sector-speciﬁc emissions tax, higher administrative costs more than
oﬀset gains from the induced emissions reduction (dU/di 
 0 for any i so
that o
i  0).
Figure 3.2 illustrates the case of emissions taxes in terms of the trade-
oﬀ between eﬃciency and administrative costs (see section 3.2). Private
grosswelfare,Y,ismaximizedforzeroemissionstaxes,since,looselyspeak-
ing, emissions taxes impede free-market forces. However, they reduce
damage D and hence improve social welfare. In a ﬁrst-best world without
administrative costs, the Pigouvian tax ** i maximizes welfare Y  D.I n
the presence of administrative costs T, the gross welfare cost of emissions
taxation (i.e., the eﬀect on U  D) is higher and rises more steeply with
tax rates. The (second-best) optimal tax maximizes Y  T  D, and it can
be easily seen that this tax is below the ﬁrst-best tax. In panel B of ﬁgure
3.2, transaction costs rise steeply with the tax rate, and the ﬁxed-cost com-
ponent is large. As a result, the second-best optimal emission tax is 0.
How emission taxes should be optimally diﬀerentiated across sectors is
also revealed by condition (17), conditional on being implemented. Note
that the optimal tax equals marginal damage minus a correction term that
is proportional to marginal administrative costs. The optimal tax equals
the Pigouvian tax if marginal administrative costs are 0 (dT/di  0). The
gap between optimal taxes and the Pigouvian tax widens if administrative
costs rise steeply with tax levels and if emissions are not very sensitive to
emissions taxation. The second may arise because of a low elasticity of de-
mand (it is hard to accomplish emissions reductions by cutting demand)
or because the emissions intensity is not very sensitive to emissions-tax
changes (steeply rising abatement and input substitution costs). To clarify
19. To see this, substitute equation (17) into (18).
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Fig. 3.2 The optimal second-best tax rate for an emissions tax with (A) low and
(B) high transaction coststhis, we decompose the emissions-reduction eﬀect of the tax, which ap-
pears as the denominator in (17), into these three eﬀects:






















































That is, ε represents the eﬀect of emissions taxes on emissions through
changes in demand,  measures the direct eﬀect of emissions taxation on
emissions through abatement, and  measures the analogous eﬀect
through input reduction (the reason to separate  and  becomes clear in
subsection 3.3.4).
So far, we have assumed that administrative costs rise with tax rates
because incentives to evade increase with the tax rate, thus raising the cost
for the tax authority to administer the tax. The opposite, however, is pos-
sible as well. Using a partial equilibrium model, Polinsky and Shavell
(1982) ﬁnd that the optimal emissions tax in the presence of administrative
costs may be larger than the Pigouvian tax. The argument is that a higher
emissions tax saves on transaction costs if administrative costs depend on
the number of taxpaying ﬁrms and if an increase in the emissions tax re-
duces market demand and the number of ﬁrms. In our setup, the number
of ﬁrms is indeterminate because of the constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion functions, but the equation immediately shows that Polinsky and Sha-
vell’s result also applies here if administrative costs decrease with the tax
rate, that is, if dT/di 
 0.
3.3.4 Input Taxes: The Role of Linkage
To investigate the trade-oﬀ between emissions taxes and input taxes, we
ﬁrst consider sector-speciﬁc taxes on emissions (i) and on the use of input
x (txi). Evaluating equation (14) for these taxes, we ﬁnd20
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Note that  measures the direct eﬀect of input taxation on emissions,21 
measures the elasticity of the emissions function with respect to input use,
and  measures how much input use is more sensitive to input taxation
than to emissions taxes.
According to equation (24), input taxes can serve as environmental
taxes and reduce the need for explicit emissions taxes. Note that the ﬁrst
two terms are the same as in equation (17) after the substitution of equa-
tion (19). The smaller the direct emissions-tax eﬀect ε   dE/
d, the larger is not only the eﬀect of marginal administrative costs on
optimal emissions taxes, but also the scope for input taxes to replace emis-
sions taxes, as is clear from the third term in equation (24). Indeed, with
high marginal administrative costs of emissions taxes, input taxes only
should be used as environmental taxes and should be set according to


























Note that inputs should then be taxed according to their marginal emis-
sions content dEi/dXi times marginal damage D corrected for administra-
tive costs as a result of changes in input use. (Of course, we must make
the provision that in the presence of large ﬁxed administrative costs, such
that equation [15] is violated for txi, the input tax should not be imple-
mented.)
Replacing emissions taxes by input taxes reduces eﬃciency. Input taxes
distort the input mix and fail to provide direct incentives for abatement.
Only if the input-to-emissions ratio is constant and there are no abatement
possibilities are the input taxation and emissions taxation equivalent in
the absence of transaction costs. This corresponds to ei/xi  constant, 
1, and 0. With an interior solution, conditions (24) and (25) can
then be rewritten as
21. It can be derived, from equations (3) and (4), that dx/di  e ai(dai/dtxi)  e xi(dxi/dtxi).
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With a ﬁxed emissions-input ratio, input and emissions taxes would be
equivalent in the absence of administrative costs (as is well known; see,
e.g., Xepapadeas 1999). Indeed, according to condition (25), without mar-
ginal administrative costs, any combination of taxes such that i  txixi/
ei  D would achieve the ﬁrst-best optimum. This implies that the two
taxes are equally eﬃcient in terms of the sum of gross private welfare and
the environmental beneﬁt (see section 3.2). Hence, transaction costs con-
siderations entirely determine the choice between the two taxes.
Diﬀerences in (ﬁxed and/or variable) administrative costs across tax in-
struments remove the indeterminacy in the optimal tax choice. First, if
ﬁxed administrative costs diﬀer across the two taxes, but administrative
costs are not aﬀected by tax-rate levels, to satisfy the entry condition only
the tax with lowest ﬁxed administrative costs should be introduced, either
i  D or txixi/ei  D. Note that the eﬀective tax on pollution equals
marginal damage (the Pigouvian tax). Second, when both tax rates in-
crease administrative costs, the eﬀective tax on pollution (i  txixi/ei)
should be smaller than marginal damage D. When, in addition, the sum
of ﬁxed administrative costs for the two taxes are suﬃciently small to jus-
tify the introduction of both taxes, the taxes should be set so as to mini-
mize variable administrative costs, as appears in the second equality in
(28).
In the general case of variable and sector-speciﬁc emissions per unit of
input, input taxes are less eﬃcient than emissions taxes. Hence, if at the
same time administrative costs for emissions taxes are higher, eﬃciency
and administrative costs may be optimally traded oﬀ by choosing a mixed
system of input and emissions taxes. Solving equations (24) and (25) for
an interior solution, and for simplicity assuming that abatement and input
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Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 109In the above expressions, i measures the “eﬃciency edge” of emissions
taxes over input taxes. Indeed with a constant emissions input ratio (
0a n d1), we have 0, and equations (29)–(30) collapse to equation
(28). The eﬃciency edge of emissions taxes increases in abatement possi-
bilities  a n di n| 1|. We call this latter expression the extent of linkage
between emissions and inputs. The closer to unity the elasticity of emis-
sions is with respect to inputs (), the closer is the correspondence between
inputs and emissions, and the more eﬃciently input taxes mimic emissions
taxes. Equations (29) and (30) reveal that marginal administrative costs
are less important in determining the optimal tax rates if the eﬃciency of
emissions taxes relative to input taxes () is larger, that is, if more abate-
ment possibilities abound ( is larger) and emissions are more closely
linked to inputs ( is closer to 1).
3.3.5 Lessons from the Model
To internalize environmental externalities in the presence of administra-
tive costs, pure emissions taxes are optimal only under speciﬁc conditions.
These conditions include (1) low ﬁxed administrative costs, (2) not-too-
steeply-rising administrative costs (as a result of increases in emissions
taxes) relative to marginal damage and direct emissions-reduction eﬀect
of emissions taxes, and (3) relatively low incentive eﬀects from alternative
environmental taxes (taxes on polluting inputs) to reduce emissions. The
optimal second-best rate of emissions taxes falls short of marginal damage.
Input taxes may indeed serve as (optimal) environmental taxes. With
the close linkage between input use and emissions, and if abatement of
emissions (as an alternative means of reducing the pollution intensity of
production, rather than changing the input mix) is relatively costly, taxes
on polluting inputs may supplement emissions taxes that fall short of mar-
ginal damage to internalize pollution externalities more fully. In this case
a mixed system of emissions taxes and input taxes is optimal, essentially
because it saves on administrative costs while only moderately aﬀecting
incentives to reduce emissions. If linkage is close and abatement expensive,
and if administrative costs associated with input taxation are suﬃciently
low relative to administrative costs associated with emissions taxation, in-
put taxes should fully replace emissions taxes.
3.4 Carbon Taxation and Administrative Costs
In this section we assess existing and potential environmental taxes rele-
vant for climate change policy, in particular through carbon taxation. We
argue that current policy (proposals) can be substantially improved if the
trade-oﬀ between incentive regulation and administrative costs is explicitly
taken into account. We concentrate on the explicit carbon taxes intro-
duced in a number of European countries since the beginning of the 1990s.
110 Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. VolleberghWe ﬁrst review relevant facts on existing carbon taxes, then present evi-
dence on administrative costs, next assess current carbon taxes, and ﬁnally
discuss the scope for improvement.
3.4.1 Carbon Taxes in Practice
Since the early 1990s, taxes have been seriously considered to combat
climate change, in particular carbon taxes to curb CO2 emissions (e.g.,
Pearce 1991; Cnossen and Vollebergh 1992; Poterba 1992). The debate in
Europe was strongly inﬂuenced by a proposal of the European Commis-
sion, COM(92) 226 (European Commission 1992), for a hybrid European
Union (EU) tax on energy/CO2 to be implemented at the European level.
The basic idea behind this proposal is to bring the (minimum) rate struc-
ture more in accordance with the carbon content across currently taxed
energy products, mainly hydrocarbon fuels, as well as to extend the carbon
tax base to energy products that are not yet subject to an excise. The same
idea is also behind the carbon taxes actually implemented in several Euro-
pean countries.
Thus the aim is to raise the implicit taxation of carbon at the margin.
As is well known, the amount of CO2 emitted per kind of fuel diﬀers con-
siderably (see table 3.1). Clearly, oil emits less carbon than coal does. Nat-
ural gas, in turn, is cleaner than oil. The obvious implication is that emis-
sions intensities also can be reduced by internalizing the respective carbon
contents in the price of each kind of fossil fuel. By diﬀerentiating the fossil
fuel excise by the carbon emissions coeﬃcient instead of energy content
coeﬃcient, or even a hybrid coeﬃcient, the consumption of carbon is put
at a disadvantage at the margin. Thus, users would be induced to substitute
oil for coal and natural gas for coal and oil, and, further, nonfossil fuels
for fossil fuels.
However, the EU proposal was never implemented due to considerable
resistance from industry and speciﬁc countries such as the United King-
dom. Despite this failure to implement an EU-wide carbon tax, several
Table 3.1 Characteristics of Main Fossil Fuels
Normalized
Energy Carbon Tons of Oil Carbon
Content Content Equivalent Content
Fuel (GJ) (ton) (TOE) (ton/TOE)
Coal (metric ton) 25–30 0.61 0.6 0.96–1.00
Crude oil (barrel) 6.1 0.12 1 0.76–0.84
Natural gas (1,000 m3) 9.6–10.7 0.17 8.0a 0.56–0.64
Source: OECD/IEA (1993).
aAverage for Gronings gas, based on the upper bound of 8.37381 and lower bound of
7.535714.
Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 111individual European countries have introduced explicit carbon taxes (see
table 3.2). Finland, at that time not a member state, was the ﬁrst country
to impose a CO2 tax in 1990. This environmental tax is additional to an
excise tax (basic duty) and is calculated according to the carbon and en-
ergy content of the energy products. Furthermore, it is imposed on primary
energy inputs, including heavy fuel oil, liquiﬁed petroleum gas (LPG),
coal, and natural gas.
Other Nordic countries soon followed: Norway and Sweden in 1991,
and Denmark in 1992. The CO2 tax in Norway aﬀects the use of mineral
oils, coal, natural gas, and petroleum on the continental shelf. Interest-
ingly, CO2 tax rates diﬀer among these products, with petroleum and natu-
ral gas [sic!] taxed most heavily (per unit CO2) and heavy fuel oil and coal
at a much lower level. Also, electricity production and consumption are
taxed. Sweden’s CO2 tax applies to primary energy inputs, such as natural
gas and coal, but also includes heavy fuel oil and gas oil. The Danish tax
is levied on all energy products with the exception of petrol and amounts
to a tax-rate reform from dollars per liter to dollars per unit carbon. A
tax reform in 1996 explicitly distinguishes energy consumption in industry
according to the categories room heating, light processes, and heavy pro-
cesses, with tax rates varying accordingly.
The Netherlands has had an environmental tax on fuels (hydrocarbon
oils) since 1988, with the CO2 component added in 1990. However, only the
regulatory tax on energy from 1996 was speciﬁcally aimed at achieving car-
bon emissions reduction by households and small ﬁrms. The tax base in-
cluded primary energy products, while the tax rates correspond to the
proposed EU CO2 energy tax. Austria also imposed an energy tax on elec-
tricity and natural gas in 1996.
In a recent analysis of these carbon taxes, Ekins and Speck (1999) show
how exemptions for industry are used to provide considerable tax relief for
certain sectors facing considerable competitive pressure. Tax relief is usu-
ally established by applying lower or zero carbon tax rates or systems of
rebate for speciﬁc industries that use these products as inputs (often in
addition to exemptions already provided for already existing energy ex-
cises). Sometimes a maximum is set to the tax liability for speciﬁc energy-
intensive industries, such as the steel industry, usually in terms of a per-
centage of sales value (this provision was also envisaged in the hybrid EU
tax). Finally, improvements in energy eﬃciency are promoted by explicitly
targeted tax reliefs. As a result, nominal and eﬀective tax rates for speciﬁc
industries tend to diﬀer considerably.
Table 3.3 shows that for several energy products Sweden, Denmark, and
Norway apply much lower eﬀective rates for speciﬁc industries. Only Fin-
land does not apply lower rates, although this is now heavily debated in
Finland. Furthermore, it is remarkable that considerable diﬀerences exist
in tax rates per ton of CO2 across energy products, especially in Norway.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Norway, like Finland, exempts LPG, while coal and natural gas are taxed
(much) more heavily than is oil.
The carbon taxes in the Nordic countries are quite similar to the original
proposal for a common carbon tax within the EU jurisdiction (see Euro-
pean Commission 1992 and its evaluation by Smith and Vollebergh 1993).
This tax is aimed at lowering the use of fossil fuels in proportion to their
carbon content. The European carbon/energy tax, the ﬁrst explicit uni-
form EU-wide tax, was proposed as an additional tax on top of the (non)
existing taxes. Since the tax base would include several energy products
that were not subject to tax before, the proposal also broadens the tax base
of current energy taxes. Thus, an incentive would be provided for indus-
try and consumers to reduce their use of carbon-based energy, and hence
for CO2 emissions to be reduced.
Because this EU proposal was never implemented, a later proposal was
more closely linked to the existing drafts on Mineral Oil Excise Harmoni-
zation, COM(95) 172 (European Commission forthcoming) and therefore
concentrated its eﬀort on a much smaller carbon tax base (see table 3.2
and its evaluation in Vollebergh 1995). In 1997, the European Commission
came up with a new proposal to use the directive on excise harmonization
across EU countries more speciﬁcally for the purpose of a carbon tax pol-
icy (see Ekins and Speck 1999 for further details). According to this pro-
posal the minimum target levels for the existing excise taxes on mineral oils
should be raised in three steps; small minimum rates on primary energy
products, such as coal and natural gas, are also proposed, as well as a tax
on electricity (see table 3.2 for the proposed rates for 2000).
All EU proposals allow for exemptions. In the 1992 draft directive, an
exemption would depend on a case-by-case assessment of the degree of
competitive pressure faced from countries not taking equivalent measures.
Member states could grant ﬁrms a reduction in the carbon tax payable
(through an exemption or an equivalent refund) if energy costs (minus the
Table 3.3 Eﬀective Tax Rates of Explicit CO2 Taxes for Some Industries in the
Nordic Countries (% of nominal tax rates)
Sweden, Norway,
Manufacturing Denmark, Pulp/Paper Finland, All
Energy Products Industry Heavy Processes Industry Industry
Gas oil (heating) 0.50 0.24 0.50 1.0
Heavy fuel oil 0.50 0.23 0.50 1.0
LPG 0.50 0.25 0 0
Coal 0.50 0.25 1.0 1.0
Natural gas 0.50 0.24 1.0 1.0
Source: Calculations based on Ekins and Speck (1999, 380).
114 Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. Volleberghvalue-added tax) amount to at least 8 percent of value-added. In addition,
the proposed directive in 1992 also allows for reductions or refunds if ﬁrms
invest in energy-eﬃciency improvements or carbon abatement.
To summarize, the recently introduced (unilateral) carbon taxes in sev-
eral European countries indeed broaden the existing (implicit) carbon tax
base by including speciﬁc primary energy products, such as coal and natu-
ral gas. These products were usually not taxed before. The agents who pay
the tax are mainly (downstream) distributors of ﬁnal fuel products or elec-
tricity at the point of delivery to households and to small and large busi-
nesses. Furthermore, with the exception of Norway, the tax rate is equal per
unitcarbon acrossenergy productsand isinterwoven with(existing) energy
excise rates, if available. Finally, with the exception of Finland, all Nordic
countries choose to exempt speciﬁc agents, mainly energy-intensive indus-
tries, by applying (much) lower or even zero carbon tax rates.
3.4.2 Evidence on Administrative Costs
An empirical estimation of the administrative costs of diﬀerent environ-
mental tax policies does not, to our knowledge, exist. The same holds for
compliance costs with only a few exceptions, such as Fullerton’s (1996)
analysis of the Superfund’s corporate environmental tax. Direct estimates
of the administrative costs of carbon taxes are also lacking. This section
reviews the existing evidence on the administrative costs of taxation in
general, and the factors that appear from this literature as relevant for the
level of these costs.
The lack of evidence on administrative costs is not surprising because
only a few explicit environmental taxes exist in practice (see, e.g., Fullerton
1996). Explicit environmental taxes are those for which the legislator has
explicitly expressed the aim that this tax should serve some environmental
purpose. However, the analysis of environmental taxation and administra-
tive costs would be severely restricted if one were to limit the analysis to
explicit environmental taxes only. As shown in section 3.3, input taxes are
also important for environmental purposes. Indeed, taxes such as excise
taxes and value-added taxes (VAT) aﬀect the environment (e.g., taxes on
gasoline and driving), as well as provisions in income taxes (tax allowances
for commuting expenses, mine exploration, pollution control equipment,
etc.).22 For carbon taxation, current energy taxes, such as excises on hydro-
carbon oils, are the most important because they are likely to have an im-
pact on emissions through changes in input mix and changes in demand for
energy.
Unfortunately, empirical information on the administrative costs of
22. Barthold (1994) mentions 51 federal tax-code provisions for the United States, and the
OECD in more recent inventories mentions a much larger number of relevant taxes.
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exist regarding how to measure these costs, especially their absolute levels.
One issue is the signiﬁcant element of transferability between compliance
costs and administrative costs (Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick 1989,
203). Also, diﬃculties arise in categorizing operating costs. For instance,
the (marginal) cost of transferring forms is highly inﬂuenced by the level
of integration with existing administration.
Table 3.4 summarizes the results of Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick
(1989). Both the administrative and compliance costs of each tax are ex-
pressed as a percentage of the revenue raised by the tax. Administrative
costs vary from 0.12 percent for the petroleum revenue tax to 1.53 percent
for the income tax. The overall picture is clear: income tax and VAT are
relatively expensive to administer, while excise duties are especially inex-
pensive in terms of administrative costs. This ﬁnding is also in accordance
with ﬁndings in other studies; although OECD (1988) provides lower esti-
mates on the total cost of VAT (between 0.40 and 1.09 percent), this study
also ranks income taxes as being relatively most expensive and excises
(interpreted as a single-stage general consumption tax) as being least ex-
pensive to implement (total cost around 0.5 percent).24
Because Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) also include compli-
ance costs, we can test whether we bias our analysis by focusing on admin-
istrative costs only. On average, compliance costs are three times higher
than administrative costs. Compliance costs are relatively higher only for
VAT. It is more important for our purposes, however, that the ranking of
diﬀerent types of taxes according to implementation costs is the same,
whether we use administrative costs or total operating costs. Hence, the
23. Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) analyze administrative and compliance costs
of diﬀerent taxes in the United Kingdom in 1986–87. OECD (1988) discusses operating costs
for consumption taxes relative to other taxes.
24. See the discussion in Cnossen (1994).
Table 3.4 Relative Administrative and Compliance Costs of Diﬀerent Types of
Taxes (% of total revenue)
Administrative Compliance Total Operating
Tax or Group Costs Costs Costs
Income tax 1.53 3.40 4.93
VAT 1.03 3.69 4.72
Corporation tax 0.52 2.22 2.74
Petroleum revenue tax 0.12 0.44 0.56
Excise duties (hydrocarbon oils;
tobacco, alcoholic drinks) 0.25 0.20 0.45
Minor taxes (stamp duty, cars,
betting and gambling) 0.85 1.48 2.33
Source: Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989, 192).
116 Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. Volleberghbasic picture is not inﬂuenced by adding compliance costs. The similar
relative importance of compliance and administrative costs across diﬀerent
taxes suggests that administrative costs can be taken as being representa-
tive of both.
We now turn to the factors that determine the level of the administrative
costs (see also section 3.2.1). Administrative costs as a percentage of the
total revenue raised by a tax are not very relevant for the choice between
diﬀerent types of taxes. It is more important to know their ﬁxed- and
variable-costs characteristics, and how they are aﬀected by the choice of
tax base and rate. Unfortunately, such information is available only in a
very limited way. As far as the role of the number of taxpayers is con-
cerned, empirical information on the administrative costs of VAT indeed
suggests the existence of economies of scale. In that case, costs per regis-
tered business should be relatively lower in countries with a low small-
business exemption than in countries with a high exemption; broadening
the tax base across a larger number of taxpayers reduces overall adminis-
trative costs per taxpayer. Cnossen (1994, 1652) notes that the data ob-
served by OECD (1988), with the exception of Denmark, indeed ﬁt this
observation.
Another important determinant of administrative costs is the measur-
ability of the tax base. One factor here is the diﬀerences among taxpayers.
Some taxpayers will be more expensive to tax due to speciﬁc characteris-
tics that have to be checked. Again, an interesting example is the small-
business exemption from VAT. The larger the exemption, the smaller the
number of registered businesses and the lower the absolute levels of admin-
istrative costs (see Cnossen 1994, 1652). Usually exemptions will be re-
sponsible for higher administrative costs. For instance, to give a tax rebate
to a particular industry requires extra excise oﬃcers to handle and check
such claims. Of course, exemptions for speciﬁc agents can also lower ad-
ministrative costs if the agent is liable neither for the tax payment nor
for a rebate. We do not ﬁnd evidence for the assumption that more com-
plex forms for calculating the tax base would raise administrative costs.
Also, empirical studies have not tried to quantify the precise shape of the
ﬁxed- and variable-costs components of administrative costs of diﬀerent
tax types in relation to the use of diﬀerences in tax rates.
No decisive empirical information exists on the (general) shape of the
transaction-costs curve for diﬀerent types of taxes, especially environmen-
tal taxes. Moreover, as observed by Cnossen (1994, 1663), the ﬁndings of
Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) on the comparatively high VAT
compliance costs are in clear contrast with evidence on VAT compliance
costs in Germany. Here the estimated costs are only a fraction of the costs
observed for the United Kingdom, which is mainly explained by the much
longer tradition and experience in Germany and the integration of VAT
with the administration of the business income tax. Thus, even if some
Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 117information exists, the evidence seems to be dependent on local circum-
stances and institutional settings.
The implementation and enforcement of environmental taxes, however,
has much in common with the operation of the age-old excises on alcohol,
tobacco, and petroleum products (Cnossen 1977). Generally, these excises
rely on quantitative measurement for assessment purposes, with compli-
anceensuredthroughphysicalcontrols.Similarclosecontrolsshouldbeex-
ercised at points of import.25 Thus, it seems safe beforehand not to always
expect prohibitively high administrative costs for environmental taxes.
This might be diﬀerent only if the regulatory tax base asks for the monitor-
ing of emissions that are diﬃcult to measure and that therefore require
costly metering technology.
Furthermore, the change in administrative costs depends heavily on the
sectors already subject to other existing taxes or environmental regulation.
For instance, according to Hoornaert (1992, 87), the physical control nec-
essary for energy excises is very closely related to carbon taxes, while ad-
ministrative controls for VAT are quite diﬀerent and more time-consuming.
The same might hold for other regulatory procedures that are already in
force. Usually direct controls for environmental purposes also reﬂect tight
supervision of technological processes and quantitative measurement.
Thus, if closely linked production processes are already subject to monitor-
ing, administrative costs need not be very high.
Summarizing, the level of administrative costs depends much on how
emissions speciﬁcally relate to the production processes, their heterogene-
ity, and the number of these processes included in the tax base. Using
existing excises for environmental regulation might be a relatively cheap
way of taxing emissions since tax oﬃcers already have a lot of information
required to operate the tax system.
3.4.3 Assessment in Terms of the Trade-Oﬀ
As noted before, the overall eﬀect on welfare of introducing new envi-
ronmental taxes, such as carbon taxes, should be compared to the incen-
tives provided by the tax. An important result of our theoretical model is
that input taxes oﬀer an interesting alternative for emissions taxes if three
conditions are met (see the end of section 3.3.4 in particular). First, there
should be a clear linkage between inputs and emissions. Second, only few
possibilities must exist for abating carbon emissions separately. Third, the
administrative costs of emissions taxes should be high. In this section, we
argue that these conditions are indeed met in the case of carbon taxation
that supports the strategy chosen by the various countries applying these
25. Note that the tax base of speciﬁc excises requires physical control due to the physical
dimensions in which they are usually expressed (dollars per unit, liter, etc.). This is funda-
mentally diﬀerent from taxes expressed on an ad valorem basis (percentage of price or
[added] value).
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in practice leaves considerable room for improvement.
The ﬁrst condition is related to the linkage issue (measured through | 
 1 | as part of the eﬃciency edge, i, in section 3.3.4). In the carbon case,
CO2 emissions are indeed in a one-to-one correspondence with the carbon
content in energy products used as inputs (e.g., crude or reﬁned oil prod-
ucts, natural gas, and various types of coal). Moreover, (potential) harmful
CO2 emissions are mainly related to the consumption of fossil fuels in mod-
ern societies. Thus, rather than taxing each unit of carbon emitted sepa-
rately, it is rational to use taxes on energy products that contain carbon to
pursue climate-change objectives. Such taxes on energy products provide
indirect incentives, using the relationship between the burning of these
products and transactions that can more easily be taxed. Thus, instead of
taxing the emissions from car exhaust, an additional tax may be levied
on gasoline purchases, on the assumption that the environmental damage
caused is proportional to the amount of gasoline used.
This approach is indeed largely reﬂected in the carbon taxes applied in
practice. They all take advantage of this fact by using carbon content of
fuels as its tax base (although often a hybrid tax base is applied with a
combination of both carbon and energy content). Thus coal-based energy-
production processes are put at a disadvantage compared to other fossil
and nonfossil fuel energy products. The same holds for oil relative to natu-
ral gas and nonfossil fuels. This is entirely in alliance with the purpose of
the tax: providing much better targeted incentives compared to an indirect
excise tax on energy alone. However, applying diﬀerences in tax rates per
unit of carbon, as in the Norwegian case, cannot be justiﬁed and the rate
structure as applied considerably weakens its incentive eﬀect (e.g., coal is
taxed at a much lower rate compared to natural gas, which contains fewer
units of carbon per unit of energy).
The second important condition is that only few possibilities should ex-
ist to abate carbon emissions separately (measured through  as part of
the eﬃciency edge, i). If emissions are very sensitive to emissions taxa-
tion, that is, if agents can abate CO2 emissions easily, input taxes might
become ineﬃcient because they do not provide appropriate incentives for
reducing carbon emissions directly. In other words, a loss in the eﬃciency
of input taxes can be expected only if direct carbon abatement is possible,
although not stimulated by a tax levied on the agents who are responsible
for these CO2 emissions. With respect to the abatement of carbon emis-
sions (carbon disposal), indeed relatively few possibilities are available and
almost none is actually employed.26 Furthermore, these possibilities can
26. Of course, many opportunities exist for savings on energy use (improvements of energy
eﬃciency) that also implicitly reduces carbon emissions (Eskeland and Devarajan 1996).
However, the condition applied here is the improvement of carbon eﬃciency at the margin
(as measured through the eﬃciency edge of emissions taxes over input taxes; see section
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the reach of small individual ﬁrms or households. Thus, the use of input
taxes in the case of carbon is indeed justiﬁed in this respect, in particular
because the explicit carbon tax rates are very low.27
The third condition is that administrative costs related to emissions
taxes should be high, or, in other words, the cost of input taxation should
be relatively small; see equations (29) and (30), in particular. Usually ad-
ministrative cost of newly designed taxes are relatively expensive due to a
ﬁxed setup cost of monitoring activities. This also applies to excise taxes,
whether they are emissions or input taxes, even though they are cheap to
administer compared with other types of taxes (see section 3.4.2). For that
reason, tax reform of existing taxes is very attractive for policymakers be-
cause the eﬀect on (marginal) administrative costs can be expected to be
small. A rise of the marginal carbon tax rate is simply reached by using
the existing implicit energy taxes on carbon (i.e., the existing energy ex-
cises). Thus, tax-rate reform is suﬃcient, that is, a reform of currently ex-
isting energy-input taxes toward taxes based on emissions coeﬃcients (see
section 3.4.1).
Indeed, the strategy chosen by the Nordic countries when implement-
ing carbon taxes basically follows this logic. We checked which products
and agents were already subject to energy excises in these countries in the
pre-carbon-tax period, say 1990.28 Table3.5presents ourresults. Wedistin-
guish between three potential groups of taxpayers: households (Hh), in-
dustrial consumers (I), and electricity generators (E). It is immediately
clear from this table that the most important carbon-containing energy
products consumed or produced in the Nordic countries were already sub-
ject to energy excises before the introduction of the carbon tax. The basic
picture is that existing excises were levied on fuels consumed by house-
holds, with the exception of natural gas in Sweden and Norway (which is
a small category anyway). The inputs of electricity were usually not subject
to tax, in contrast to its delivery to consumers (both households and indus-
tries). Although many energy products are subject to tax, including even
the products used as inputs in industry, it turns out that the industrial
sector is often exempted or pays lower tax rates, especially energy-inten-
sive industries (e.g., reﬁneries, and steel and aluminum producers).
Thus, the eﬀects on administrative costs of introducing carbon taxes on
3.3.4). We also exclude compensation techniques, such as carbon sequestration (by planting
trees) because they are not directly related to the production techniques employed for pro-
ducing output.
27. This might change if carbon tax policy became stricter because technological improve-
ments might considerably reduce the cost of existing carbon abatement potentials.
28. We only checked excises because the introduction of a carbon tax is closely related to
existing energy excises. Furthermore, in terms of the ﬁxed-cost element, it is not important
whether these products are VAT exempt or not. As discussed in section 3.4.2, the administra-
tive procedures for VAT diﬀer considerably with the excise administration.
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ergy excise administration. As long as this administration is also used for
the carbon tax, one can safely assume a small rise in administrative costs.
The only factor that might give an upward eﬀect is the more complicated
tax-base calculations due to the integration of two instead of one indicator
(both energy content and carbon content). The same holds for carbon tax
exemptions, especially in the case of rebates. As noted before, rebates of-
ten complicate the tax and cause higher administrative costs. If, however,
exemptions in the carbon tax also take advantage of these institutional
setups, additional administrative costs still need not be high (sunk cost
element).
In all Nordic countries, however, the carbon excise is also imposed on
new products, especially the production of electricity (use of inputs) and
natural gas. Also, coal seems to be taxed now on a more comprehensive
basis. But the eﬀects of these changes on administrative costs also seem to
be limited. Like the existing excise systems for other energy products, tax
administration can take advantage of the way in which ﬁnal fuel products,
such as diesel or electricity, is usually delivered to consumers (both indus-
try and households). The administration of energy excise taxes saves on
the number of taxpayers by using points of delivery (e.g., fuel stations
and energy distributors) instead of taxing all consumers separately. This is
applicable in the case of natural gas (delivery through pipelines), as well
as in the case of coal (points of distribution). Thus, the broadening of the
tax base implies only a small increase in the number of taxpayers.
3.4.4 Scope for Improvement
Although the current carbon tax strategy in the Nordic countries satis-
ﬁes the conditions for using input taxes instead of emissions taxes, consid-
erable scope for improvement seems to exist. The coverage of the carbon
excises in the Nordic countries (as well as the Netherlands) is far from
Table 3.5 Energy Excises Applying to Households, Industry, and the Electricity Sector in the
Nordic Countries, 1990
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Energy
Product Hh I E Hh I E Hh I E Hh I E
Diesel   
Heavy fuel 0 0 0 
Coal 0 000 n a n a 
Natural gas 0 0 0  na na 0 0 0  na
Electricity    0  0 
Source: OECD (1993a, 1993b).
Notes: Abbreviations: Hh, households; I, industry; E, electricity generation; , tax; 0, no tax; , not
used; na, not available.
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Exemptions are widely used, mainly motivated by concerns about interna-
tional competitiveness. Often the energy inputs of domestic industries are
taxed at lower rates or not taxed at all. Furthermore, the existing energy
excises related to oil products are of the ﬁnal-fuel type, which implicitly
exempts the production of the fuels themselves. Also the extraction of any
fossil fuel is not subject to this tax (although other type of taxes and subsi-
dies apply).
Our theoretical results suggest that sectoral diﬀerentiations in the tax
rate are justiﬁed by administrative costs, if linkage and marginal abate-
ment cost (MAC) diﬀer among sectors. Exemptions can also be justiﬁed
by diﬀerences in ﬁxed administrative costs. A diﬀerence between linkage
and MAC, as well as ﬁxed administrative costs among sectors, seems to
apply in the carbon case. However, current diﬀerentiation is exactly the
opposite of what our model suggests is optimal. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh
(1997) show that this observation generalizes across OECD countries. In
general, households face much higher taxes on average compared to indus-
try. Furthermore, most OECD countries tax ﬁnal oil products (e.g., diesel
and gasoline) much more heavily than primary energy products on average
(e.g., heavy fuel oil, natural gas, and coal). In this respect, the countries
that introduced a carbon tax, already applied a much broader (implicit)
carbon tax base compared to the other countries.
Thus the industries that are usually exempted now, mainly the energy-
intensive industries (both producing energy products and energy-intensive
products), are also the taxpayers who can be taxed with lowest transaction
costs per unit of emissions. In other words, the most important polluters
(the small number of taxpayers consuming the larger part of fossil fuels)
still pay only a very small amount of tax, if any. The same holds for the
choice to exempt certain energy products consumed by speciﬁc sectors,
such as coal by electricity generation. Finally, not taxing particular energy
products that cause considerable carbon emissions, such as coal, seems to
be particularly unattractive.29 Of course, issues of carbon leakage are of
considerable importance here. If a country follows a unilateral strategy
without any compensation for its carbon-exposed industries, import sub-
stitution could easily reduce the eﬀectiveness of its carbon abatement pol-
icy. However, several mechanisms are available to compensate for these
eﬀects, with small or even no negative eﬀect on administrative costs, such
as tax credits (Vollebergh, Koutstaal, and de Vries 1997).
Another issue closely linked to the selectivity of coverage is that all ex-
plicit carbon taxes are based simply on the amount of carbon contained
in the actual products. This implies that carbon emitted in the process of
producing those fuels is not taxed at all. As Pearson and Smith (1991, 29)
note, such a scheme gives an undesirable incentive to the use of highly
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29. OECD (1998) shows that coal is still subsidized in quite a number of OECD countries.reﬁned fuel products, in which as much as possible of the carbon emissions
have taken place before the excise is applied. Thus, this tax will be less
eﬃcient at encouraging carbon-reducing fuel substitutions. According to
Vollebergh (1995) it might be an eﬃcient strategy in this case to use a
materials-balance approach to impute the amount of upstream carbon
emissions related to energy products of the ﬁnal fuel type.
A third possibility for improvement is to supplement current input taxes
with incentives for abatement (introducing a mixed system of input and
emissions taxes). Although abatement of CO2 emissions is very limited for
small energy users, large industries and energy producers may have some
opportunities for abatement that are less costly than separate abatement
possibilities such as carbon sequestration. Large-scale ﬁrm-speciﬁc invest-
ments are involved in these abatement projects. Emissions taxes for energy
producers may provide appropriate abatement incentives. Moreover, the
administration costs for emissions taxes in the energy-production sector
can be expected to be considerably lower than for small industry and
households. Technologies are more homogenous, and the number of agents
is small. For large energy-intensive industries, however, the competitive-
ness argument may prevent the implementation of emissions taxes, since
these taxes increase costs and require, again, compensation schemes. Al-
ternatively, abatement subsidies decrease costs and seem more feasible.
The most important step toward more eﬃcient carbon policies is explicit
coordination of carbon policies on the EU, OECD or, better, world scale.
Carbon leakage then no longer oﬀsets unilateral carbon policies. Thus, the
exemption of large energy-intensive exporting industries to restore interna-
tional competitiveness would no longer be a reasonable strategy. Only then
would it be possible to initiate a full-ﬂedged tax reform imposing carbon
taxes on agents that have the most options for abatement, contribute most
to CO2 emissions, and for which the administrative costs involved are rela-
tively smallest.
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Comment Dallas Burtraw
The insight of the thorough and well-written paper by Sjak Smulders and
Herman Vollebergh is in identifying an important trade-oﬀ when choosing
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for the Future in Washington, D.C.
Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: Carbon Taxation 125among potential policy instruments. This is the trade-oﬀ between transac-
tion costs and incentives, which indeed has not been developed adequately
in the environmental literature. In this application, transaction costs in-
clude “administrative costs” incurred by the regulator, and “compliance
costs” incurred by the agent. “Incentives” refer to the signal to change
behavior received by the agent. Focusing on this trade-oﬀ informs the
choice of policy instruments and also draws attention to the cost of envi-
ronmental policy, which forces one away from the ﬁrst-best (Pigouvian)
level of regulation.
Drawing on the sketchy evidence available from previous studies, the
authors make some key observations. The ﬁrst is that the administrative
costs incurred by the government (which are the focus of paper, rather
than compliance costs incurred by agents) are often greater for emissions
taxes than for other types of environmental taxes, especially input taxes.
Why might this be true? One reason has to do with the measurability of the
tax base. It may be more diﬃcult to measure emissions from distributed
pollution sources than it is to measure the economic activity of those
sources because the purchase of inputs is already accounted for ﬁnancially.
The second reason may have to do with the number of agents that are
covered under various tax schemes. Typically one might imagine inputs
(such as fuel) to come from a small number of sources while emissions
come from a large number of distributed sources, and one might expect
administrative costs to vary with the number of agents that have to be
monitored.
The second observation recognizes a distinction between ﬁxed and vari-
able components, reminiscent of Stavins’s (1995) treatment of transactions
costs for tradable permits. Further, it is noted that variable costs may rise
with tax burden, or in this case with the quantity of emissions. One reason
this may be true has to do with the incentive that agents have for tax
evasion.
The authors use these observations as a point of departure to craft
broad policy guidance. Their proposition is that other environmental
taxes, especially input taxes, are preferable to emissions taxes when
1. Emissions taxes have high ﬁxed administrative costs, that is, the cost
associated with setting up a new tax on emissions. For many types of input
taxes, it is recognized that these costs are already incurred because these
taxes are already in place.
2. Emissions taxes have high elasticity of variable costs; that is, variable
costs rise sharply with the level of emissions or the tax revenue collected
from the emissions tax (as a result of increases in the tax rate).
3. The incentive eﬀects from input taxes are high with respect to the
production of emissions. For example, this occurs when there is little op-
portunity to abate emissions, so emissions have a high correlation with
taxable inputs.
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taxes, supplements a yet more fundamental trade-oﬀ guiding environmen-
tal policy analysis. Emissions taxes as a strategy to address environmental
problems are already second-best approaches. Environmental economics
ideally would recommend a ﬁrst-best strategy that would target ambient
concentrations of pollution and the marginal damages that result, the class
of direct instruments. However, in many settings it is clear that direct in-
struments are not practical because of the administrative costs of imple-
menting such a system. And so we are already in the second-best world of
considering emissions taxes, from which these authors take us still further,
toward consideration of input taxes.
The authors take this broad advice and apply it to one problem in par-
ticular, controlling emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). They ﬁnd that in
this case, at least, the shoe ﬁts. Implicitly the paper provides an endorse-
ment of the approach taken recently by several governments in Europe
that have sought to implement various environmental taxes on energy in-
puts as an indirect means of regulating CO2 emissions.
The ﬁnding is likely to survive in the context of CO2 policy because,
for the foreseeable future, a technology that allows for postcombustion
abatement of CO2 emissions will be prohibitively expensive. Therefore,
taxing inputs is identical to taxing emissions, with respect to the incentives
for emissions reduction. However, one must use care in seeking to general-
ize from this example, and it is interesting to attempt to do so.
Table 3C.1 provides a subjective assessment of the authors’ criteria ap-
plied to a number of environmental problems in the United States. In the
cases of CO2,N O X,a n dS O 2, I suggest that a range of values may apply
to the ﬁrst criterion, which asks whether high ﬁxed administrative costs
with emissions taxes exist. The reason this criterion may apply in a weak
way is that a signiﬁcant fraction of emissions, especially SO2, comes from
the electric utility sector, where continuous emissions monitors already are
required on all large fossil-ﬁred power plants under the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments. These monitors track the emissions of these three pol-
lutants, making administrative costs of enforcing a tax relatively low. In
Table 3C.1 Comparison of a Variety of Environmental Problems
High Fixed Elastic Variable Little Opportunity
Administrative Administrative for Abatement
Environmental Costs for Costs for (Inputs and
Problems Emissions Taxes? Emissions Taxes? Emissions Linked)?
CO2 Strong–weak Strong–weak Strong
NOX Strong–weak Strong–weak Weak
SO2 Weak Moderate–weak Moderate
Mercury Strong Moderate–weak Moderate
Nonpoint water pollution Strong Strong Strong–moderate
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that would apply to mercury emissions and nonpoint water pollution.
Thesecondcriterionaskswhetheradministrativecostsvarywiththemag-
nitude of the policy or quantity of emissions. Again, the electricity sector
may be a special case because the monitors are thought to be accurate.
Outside this sector, however, the incentive and opportunity for avoid-
ing monitoring may be high. However, the magnitude of potential tax rev-
enues is probably not substantial for most aﬀected industries, with the par-
ticular exceptions of CO2 and nonpoint water pollution.
The third criterion addresses the linkage between inputs and emissions.
This provides the strongest argument for an input tax for CO2 policies.
Other air pollutants oﬀer some opportunity for abatement, which severs
the link between inputs and emissions. Nonetheless, for SO2 and mercury,
mass-balance principles apply, linking inputs and residuals (either abated
or emitted). However, emissions of NOX in large part are variable with
respect to combustion temperature and other factors. Nonpoint water pol-
lution provides perhaps the second strongest link (second to CO2) since
nonpoint pollution largely is a function of inputs, although there exist
some management practices that aﬀect nonpoint pollution.
Even after taking the contribution of this paper fully into account, envi-
ronmental economists should remain sensitive and perhaps reluctant to
back away from more direct instruments for environmental control. Expe-
rience teaches us that important changes in technology and in social or-
ganizations occur as we try to build institutions that put strong incentives
in place regarding environmental performance. New technologies are
emerging for monitoring emissions sources, including continuous emis-
sions monitors on smokestacks, pollution markers that can allow the regu-
lator to trace concentrations to individual pollution sources, and remote
sensors that can be used to identify pollutant emissions from individual
vehicles. As technologies emerge, administrative costs of more ﬁnely tuned
environmental instruments fall. Hence, it is important to think about the
design of instruments in the dynamic context. For example, in the United
States the emissions reduction credit program of the early 1980s was a
mixed success. Anecdotal evidence is that the transaction costs of trades
under the program were approximately 30 to 40 percent of the value of the
trades, on average. However, under the SO2 emissions allowance trading
program in the United States in the 1990s, transaction costs have fallen to
less than 1 percent of the value of the trades. This comes from organiza-
tional learning, new institutions, and new technologies. In general, one
should give consideration in the design of environmental programs to the
enhancement of these innovations.
The authors go beyond development of the criteria discussed here to
oﬀer another proposition. They suggest that when ﬁxed administrative
costs of both environmental (input) taxes and emissions taxes are low, rela-
128 Sjak Smulders and Herman R. J. Volleberghtive to variable costs, a hybrid policy involving both types of taxes may
avoid the problem of rising variable administrative costs. This may occur
because the tax rate on emissions can be kept low because part of the
emissions reduction is occurring through substitution among inputs in re-
sponse to an input tax, and vice versa.
I remain skeptical about the eﬃciency characteristics of a hybrid of mul-
tiple taxes to achieve a desired level of emissions reduction. Each tax gives
rise to the opportunity for political horse-trading, and I fear a mix of taxes
to achieve a single policy goal would seemingly give rise to unmodeled
coordination costs. I conjecture that, in the broad scheme of things, ad-
ministrative costs as they are addressed in this paper are typically less than
the political costs of navigating the legislative process. The diﬃculty of
ﬁne-tuning the tax system would seem to be even more daunting when
multiple tax instruments are considered. In fact, toward the end of the
paper the authors provide a useful summary of existing input taxes and
identify myriad deviations from consistent or eﬃcient policy. In Europe, I
understand, there is increasing use of hybrid tax instruments to achieve
environmental tax reform. It may be that the hybrid tax instrument en-
hances the political acceptability of environmental action or that it is a
way to slip the camel’s nose (control of CO2 emissions) under the tent of
economic growth. However, it is not obvious that the outcome is likely to
be eﬃcient in the sense addressed by these authors.
These thoughts provide some cautionary notes for why we may not nec-
essarily want to move away from a more direct approach to environmental
policy making for an approach that in the short run has lower administra-
tive costs. However many of these issues are beyond the scope of the pres-
ent paper. So to close, let us return to the present paper to reconsider its
major contributions and guidance for policy.
The conclusions oﬀered for CO2 emissions reduction by the authors
align with the direction currently being taken by governments as they try
to grapple with the greenhouse gas problem. This analysis tells us that this
direction of policy is probably the right one. And also this analysis gives
us reason to focus on a critical issue—the trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst-best in-
centives and administrative costs—that is an important consideration in
actual policy design and that is often missing from economic models.
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